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Abstract
This paper studies the empirical relation between market competition and innovation
using Luxembourg’s Structural Business Statistics. The competitive pressure in Luxem-
bourg’s markets is assessed by computing a profit elasticity measure, based on the idea
of cost-efficiency. From this, the paper analyses the relation between competition and
innovation performance by estimating an equation for the determinants of R&D expen-
diture. The results show that Luxembourg’s industries are characterised by low levels of
competition intensity, especially in markets relevant to competition policy and regulation.
The relation between competition and innovation is non-linear and depends crucially on
the efficient use of inputs to production. The impact of the distribution of technological
efficiency on innovation is assessed by measuring both average technology gap and tech-
nology spread. The innovation effort is increasing as industries are closer to the frontier,
and decreasing in the technology spread.
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1 Introduction
This article analyses the relation between market competition and innovation in Luxem-
bourg’s non-financial industries.
The relationship between competition and innovation is relevant to both academics and
policy makers. Economic and policy-oriented studies often point out the link between compet-
itiveness and a country’s economic performance and welfare. Furthermore, competitiveness
and innovation are at the core of the programme of structural reform set out by EU coun-
tries in the Lisbon Strategy, with the ultimate objective of promoting economic growth and
employment.
Economists, however, suggest that the relation between competition and innovation is far
from being simple. The traditional view is that large market-leader firms are the driving forces
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behind innovation and technological progress (see, for example, Romer, 1990); this results in
a trade-off between competition and productivity growth/innovation and has an obvious pol-
icy implication: policy makers should accept a certain degree of market power in order to
encourage innovation activities. This view, however, has been questioned by several empir-
ical studies linking higher competition to increased innovation efforts. Nickell (1994) finds
that competition improves corporate performance and total factor productivity in a panel of
UK firms. Griffith et al. (2006) show a positive link between competition and innovation, as
measured by R&D intensity, in a panel of OECD countries. The models proposed by these
authors are linear specifications, where a change in competition is measured by exogenous
changes in policy variables (Griffith et al., 2006), or by a combination of exogenous indicators
(Nickell, 1994). Aghion et al. (2005) abandon the linearity assumption and find evidence that
the relation competition-innovation is non-linear, in the form of an inverted U-curve. (These
authors measure innovation by the average number of patents in an industry.) Hagen (2009)
confirms the existence of the inverted U-relationship between competition and innovation,
measured by R&D intensity, in a panel of OECD countries. The inverted U-curve depicts
a positive relation between competition and innovation at low levels of competition, and a
decreasing one at high competition levels. Aghion et al. (2005) and Boone (2000) provide
theoretical support to the non-linearity of the competition-innovation relationship. The cen-
tral idea is that profits constitute the firms’ main incentive to innovate. In this context,
competition fosters innovation by lowering pre-innovation profits more than post-innovation
rents (the so-called “escape-competition” effects). Aghion et al. (2005) argues that this effect
is more likely at low-levels of competition, providing an explanation for the non-linear effect
found in the data. In contrast, post-innovation profits, hence firms’ incentive to innovate, are
hampered by high competition.
The competition-innovation issue is of great relevance to small open economies, which are
typically highly specialised (at product and industry level) and, as a result, more exposed
to the international competition and economic cycle. Among small countries, Luxembourg
has a very small size and a high level of GDP per capita. Its economy has a strong focus on
the financial services, which account for nearly one third of its GDP. Given these facts, one
would expect Luxembourg’s innovation effort and competitive pressure to be quite different
from those of other countries. Several international institutions, such as the OECD (Lux-
embourg Country Report, 2010) and the World Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness
Report, 2009-2010), have highlighted weaknesses in the competitiveness of the Luxembourgish
economy. The OECD notes that the lack of market competitiveness may endanger recovery
and negatively affects the country’s productivity. This evaluation is performed by looking at
several indicators such as labour and product costs, product market regulations, barriers to
new entrants and competition.
Anecdotal evidence exists on the lack of competition in Luxembourg internal markets, but
little research has been done to assess the strength of competition in Luxembourgish markets
adopting formal statistical criteria. To the best of our knowledge, the only study on testing
perfect competition for Luxembourg industries and services is the one performed by DiMaria
(2008). Empirical studies on innovation are also rare and are based on Community Innovation
Survey (CIS) data. One example is Asikainen (2008), which evidence a positive link between
competition, innovation, and productivity.1 This study attempts to fill these gaps in the
1Czarnitzki and Bento (2010) uses CIS data to compare the impact of public funding on R&D expenditure in
Luxembourg and four other countries. This study highlights the specificity of innovation policy in Luxembourg.
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empirical literature using firm-level data for Luxembourg manufacturing and some key non-
manufacturing sectors. Data are sourced from the Structural Business Statistics, compiled
yearly by the Statec.
The empirical strategy adopted in this study is largely inspired by the work of Jan Boone
and by the “2-step” empirical model of Griffith et al. (2006). It involves choices on how to
measure competitive pressure and innovation effort, and comprises two steps:
1. The computation of the competition measure. The Boone index, obtained from the
estimation of a regression of profits on costs, is preferred to traditional direct measures,
such as price-cost margin and Herfindhal indices, because it is better suited to the
analysis of small open economies and has better theoretical properties. Indeed, Boone
(2008a) shows that the PE measure is monotonic in competition, a theoretical fact that
has been found to be empirically relevant by Griffith et al. (2005). The link between
market structure and competitiveness is also investigated. This is done by looking at
the relation between the Boone index and the number of firms in an industry, and by
checking whether industries characterised by a large number of small enterprises are
more competitive than those with larger firms. (The choice of the competition measure
is discussed in Section 2.)
2. The estimation of the innovation equation, which relates innovation indicators to
measures of competitiveness and several control variables. Key variables are R&D ex-
penditures, which proxies the innovation effort, the Boone index, and a technology gap
variable that describes how efficiently, on average, firms use the production inputs within
an industry. Robustness of results is assessed by using an alternative measure of com-
petitiveness (the price-cost margin) and comparing firm- and industry-level data. R&D
expenditure and patents are popular choices for measuring innovation effort in empirical
studies. Here, the choice of R&D expenditure as the innovation proxy is dictated by the
data available and supported by the evidence on the role of R&D in fostering innovation
and technological improvements (see, for example Romer, 1990; Mairesse and Mohnen,
2002).
This empirical strategy has been implemented by several nations involved in the project
“Market incentives to innovate”, in the context of the OECD Working Party on Industry
Analysis — OECD-WPIA. Using this methodology, Polder and Veldhuizen (2010) support
the existence of the inverted U-curve in the Netherlands at both firm and industry level. The
results in this paper serve as a country specific analysis linked to the above project.
The remaining of this article briefly discusses the measurement of competition (Section
2). Section 3 describes the dataset used in the analysis and discusses some issues related
to industries’ classification. Section 4 presents the results from the empirical analysis of
competitiveness and innovation in Luxembourg’s manufacturing industries. Finally, Section
5 gives concluding remarks and directions for the future research.
2 Measures of competition
To analyse the relation between competition and innovation, one has first to define what
competition is and how to measure it. Neither the academic nor the policy-oriented litera-
ture, however, provide a clear and unique definition of competition. In policy-making, the
term competitiveness usually refers to a broad set of conditions (costs, practises, regulatory
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structures, institutions, etc..) which are difficult to condensate in a single measurable indi-
cator. Thus, the following restricts our attention to a narrower but measurable definition of
competitiveness, better suited to the empirical analysis of competition by industry and to the
relation of competition to key economic variables.
In the academic literature, one often encounters different views/definitions of competition.
Competition is often identified with price-taking behaviour, and its implication of equality
of price to marginal cost (which will be referred to as the “traditional view”). The theory
of Industrial Organisation (IO) proposes instead two competing views: competition is either
linked to the number of firms present in a market, or to the aggressive conduct by an in-
cumbent firm, which affects prices and costs. Thus, an increase in competition is signalled,
respectively, by an increase in the number of firms operating in the market (following a fall
in entry barriers), or by the cost-price politics of operating firms.
Empirical difficulties add to theoretical ones. The Herfindhal index and market shares
are empirical measures of competition inspired by the IO approach. Following instead the
traditional view, researchers use the size of firms’ mark-ups, or price-cost margins (PCM), to
produce a direct measure of competition. The idea is very simple: a perfectly competitive
market is one where firms equate prices to marginal costs. Any departure from this equality
signals lack of competition and a monopolistic/oligopolistic market structure. This idea
has been first proposed by Lerner, and has been applied, among others, by Hall (1988).
Hall (1988) developed an indirect computation method for the PCM, by linking it to total
factor productivity (TFP). This author shows that, under perfect competition, the Solow
residual is given by technological change; by contrast, if the hypothesis does not hold, the
residual is also a function of inputs (namely, the capital/labour ratio). In other words, under
perfect competition, the technological progress is the only source of TFP growth. Several
authors have pointed out empirical difficulties with Hall’s method and, more generally, with
PCM measures. In particular, the endogeneity induced by the correlation of inputs to TFP
requires good instrumental variable, which are not always readily available (see, for example
Boone et al., 2007, and references therein). More generally, a difficulty with standard mark-
up measurement is the computation of costs related to the use of the capital input (ie the
user cost of capital). Nonetheless, following Hall’s seminal work, indirect measures of PCM
have become widely popular in the empirical literature, especially when the goal is to study
the relation between competition and other important economic variables (see, for example,
Nickell, 1994; Aghion et al., 2005). Theoretical studies, however, have found that the the
PCM provides a poor measure of competition (Boone, 2008a); empirically, the PCM has been
found to be poorly correlated with alternative measures of competition (Boone et al., 2007;
Duhamel and Kelly, 2009).
Here, we adopt a view of competition based on cost efficiency which has been first proposed
and developed by Boone (2008b,a). The studies of Boone are important as they constitute
a first attempt to disentangle the issues of cost efficiency and market power. Boone (2008b)
argues that a more concentrated market does not necessarily lead to less competition. More
concentrated markets can also result from a selection effect, for which inefficient firms, ie
firms which cannot decreases cost when facing fiercer competition, see a fall in profit that
forces them out of the market. So, this author proposes to measure the competitiveness of a
market/sector using the elasticity of firms’ profit with respect to marginal costs. The basic
idea is that, in all markets, an increase in costs reduces profits; however, in more competitive
markets, the fall in profits are higher, so firms are punished more harshly for being inefficient.
As a result, profits of efficient firms increase more relatively to profit of less efficient firms,
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and the least efficient firms may be pushed out of the market. A possible interpretation is
as follows. Let us consider what happens if firms increase the prices of their products when
facing an increase in costs. If firms are price-taker (ie markets are perfectly competitive),
a price increase will not be possible and the cost increase will result in a large reduction in
profits. (In highly competitive markets, firms may increase the price but will loose profits
due to a reduction in the quantity of goods sold.) By contrast, firms that have a degree of
market power will be able to translate the cost increase into a price increase without loosing
(too many) customers. In the latter case, profits will decrease less compared to the highly
competitive scenario. Thus, more elastic profits signal more competitive markets.
The resulting indicator, called by the author the Profit-Elasticity (PE) index, is often
referred to as the Boone’s index. Practical implementations at industry level are based on
the following empirical equation:
ln(Pi) = α+ β1ln(AV Ci) + β
′
sln(Xis) + i, i ∈ j (1)
where P denotes the firm’s i profits, j the industry to which firm i belongs to, and X a vector
of controls. One can see that marginal costs are approximated by average variable costs, as
suggested by Hall (1988).2 The estimated β1 gives the PE measure for industry j. Using the
model of equation 1 to measure competitive pressure in Dutch markets, Boone et al. (2007)
find empirical support for the ideas that more intense competition leads to more concentrated
market via the removal of inefficient firms, and that competition increases productivity.
In what follows, the Boone index is the preferred measures of the degree of competition in
Luxembourg’s industries. We do compare results obtained with the Boone index with those
obtained using PCM for robustness; we do not consider concentration indices and market
shares because these are not suited to the analysis of small open economies, as they express
only domestic industrial power.
3 The Data
This study uses firms’ accounting data from Luxembourg’s Structural Business Statistics
(SBS). The SBS is compiled each year by Statec, and provides information on firms’ earnings
and costs, R&D expenses, and employment. Here, we use observations on manufacturing and
service industries for the year 2006. (At present we have no data on banking and insurance.)
3
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the variables used in this analysis:
2Note that this amounts to assume that marginal costs are constant.
3In practise, the SBS survey consists of a Census of firms with at least 50 employees and a stratified sample
of firms with less than 50 employees. Small firms are surveyed at most every 4 years. The eligible population
is adjusted to take this rotation principle into account. Data on firms not surveyed on a particular year are
then estimated/extrapolated.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. skewness N
Profit 2.80 107.70 100.74 12097
Sales 4.25 112.29 96.80 12097
AVC 0.88 10.22 71.32 11862
Employment 10.34 60.91 20.85 12097
R&D expenses 1987.64 62986.77 58.16 12097
Legend: profit and sales amounts are in million Euros; average variable costs (AVC) and R&D are
reported in euros; employment is measured in physical units (FTE).
One feature emerging from this summary is the small size of Luxembourgish firms: the
average number of employees is about 10 workers, but the median number of workers is as
low as 1. (Medians are not reported for confidentiality reasons.) On average, firms spend
1980 Euros on R&D (about 0.1% of firms’ profits). Nearly 33 percent of firms report non-zero
R&D expenses (amounting to 3983 enterprises); for this group of firms, R&D expenses equal
on average 6000 Euros. Interestingly, firms investing in R&D have average profits and costs
respectively lower and higher than firms reporting zero R&D expenses. Employment charac-
teristics are instead comparable across the two groups of firms. (Results are not reported here
for reasons of space.) In general, variables have large standard deviations, and their distribu-
tions is largely skewed. In view of their asymmetric distributions, data are transformed using
the logarithmic scale.4 For illustration, figure 1 shows the density estimate of the logarithm
of profit.
The computation of the competition measures at industry level is based on the NACE
industries’ classification, Rev. 1.1. (Due to data availability, computations are performed
at NACE 2-digit level.) To capture industries effects in the innovation equation, we further
classify the industries according to their innovation content. The following section briefly
discusses this innovation-based classification.
Figure 1: Profit distribution (in logs).
4Before undertaking the analysis, observations on firms with average variable costs missing (ie firms with no
turnover) and zero profits have been removed from the sample. Furthermore, taking logs allows us to eliminate
firms reporting zero or negative profits and/or zero employment.
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3.1 A technology based classification of firms
Empirical studies of innovation often capture firms’ patterns (and intensity) of innovation
by using a technology-based classification of industries. In his seminal paper, Pavitt (1984)
proposes a taxonomy that groups firms into four categories on the grounds of their techno-
logical competences and their main source of innovation. Categories are as follows 1) supplier
dominated category; 2) specialised suppliers; 3) scale intensive; 4) science intensive. The
supplier oriented category include traditional industries, which innovate mainly by acquiring
machinery and equipment. So, for such firms, innovation is mainly induced by their suppli-
ers. The second group of firms comprises specialised suppliers of machinery and equipment,
where innovation is demand-dependent. Scale-intensive firms are active in mass production
industries, whereas science-based firms exploit new technology knowledge, mainly sourced
by in-house R&D laboratories. The supplier dominated category is the one characterised by
lowest technology orientation.
In practical implementation, firms are grouped according to Pavitt’s taxonomy on the
basis of a NACE-type (or NAICS) 4-digit classification. The NACE classification aggregates
firms into industries according to the typology of their main product; the whole industry is
then attributed to one of the Pavitt’s groups.
Here, we adopt the Technological Intensity classification proposed by Hatzychronoglou
(1997), now adopted by the OECD and widely used by empirical application as an alterna-
tive/update to Pavitt taxonomy. This taxonomy groups industries into low-tech, medium-
high-tech, medium-low-tech and high-tech. To adapt this classification to the case at hand,
we have considered only two groups: medium/high-tech and low-tech industries. We also
added a further category that comprises services, construction, and public utilities industries.
Both the classifications above present several methodological drawbacks. For example,
Pavitt’s taxonomy was meant to classify firms rather than industries. (Furthermore, Pavitt
aimed to classify only innovative firms, rather than all firms.) Indeed, any NACE output-based
classification inevitably groups firms with heterogeneous level and practices of innovation.
Thus, this method leads to inaccuracies and errors in the classification of industries (this
point is effectively argued by Archibugi, 2000) and may affect reliability of empirical results.
This is particularly true for Luxembourg, where some high-tech firms are found in branches
regarded by Pavitt’s classification as low-innovation ones. More research is needed to achieve
a technological intensity-based classification of Luxembourgish firms that takes into account
the specificity of this economy.
4 Empirical analysis
This section presents results from the empirical analysis of the relation between competi-
tiveness and innovation in Luxembourg’s industries. Firstly, we measure the degree of mar-
ket competitiveness by implementing the profit elasticity (PE) measure proposed by Boone
(2008a). Then, we use the results from this analysis to specify and estimate an innovation
equation. In particular, we check whether competition is capable of boosting innovation by es-
timating a set of equations in which innovation, as measured by R&D expenditure, is regressed
on measures of markets’ competitiveness, technical efficiency, employment and industry ef-
fects. Robustness of results is assessed by using an alternative measure of competitiveness
and comparing firm- and industry-level data. This empirical strategy is being developed by
the OECD in the context of the Working Party on Industry Analysis (WPIA).
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4.1 Competitiveness in Luxembourg’s industries
This section analyses two measures of competition in Luxembourgish industries: the Boone
index, or profit-elasticity (PE) measure, and the price cost margin (PCM). The Boone index
summarises, at industry level, the cost-efficiency of firms, whereas the PCM provides direct
measures of mark-ups. The PCM is computed by dividing profit by sales, as suggested by
Aghion et al. (2005).
The Boone index measures the elasticity of firms’ profit with respect to their cost level.
The highest the elasticity the highest is the degree of competitiveness of the industry. In
practise, the index is given by the estimated β1 coefficient (the Boone parameter) in the
regression of profits on variable costs:
ln(Πi) = β0 + β1 ln(Ci) + β2 ln(Li) + i; (2)
Here, Πi denotes firm i’s profit, C and L denote — respectively — average variable costs and
employment, which is included to control for firms’ size. (Variables are in logs.) Regressions
are estimated separately for each industry. Table 3 summarises regression results for Lux-
embourg’s industries. A higher value of the Boone parameter signals a higher elasticity of
profits, thus a more intense competition. (Detailed regression results are reported in Table 9
in the Appendix.) The highest PE is recorded for the transport equipment manufacturing and
the manufacturing of electrical equipment. These results, however, are difficult to interpret
due to the low number of observations and the heterogeneity of the firms in those categories.
The corresponding NACE code for motor vehicle manufacturing, for example, comprises also
aerospace products. One explanation for the high efficiencies could be that these “compo-
nent manufacturing” activities face stronger international competition, because they produce
goods aimed at foreign markets. The lowest PEs characterise the public utilities industry (ie
electricity, gas and water supply) and the wholesale industry. This findings confirm the low
competition in Luxembourg’s service sector pointed out by the OECD (2010). The lack of a
panel of observations prevents us to check the stability of the results over time. These results,
however, are in line with the previous study by DiMaria (2008). Using a different methodol-
ogy, this author finds that mark ups vary greatly across industries but are on average greater
for the service sectors than in manufacturing.
Table 2: Measures of Competition: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median St. dev. Min Max Obs
Boone index 2.84 2.45 1.43 1.16 25.19 12089
PCM .51 .40 .28 .00 .99 12089
Corr. Boone-PCM −0.65 (0.000)
Legend: Correlation p-value in brackets.
Table 2 gives the summary statistics for the competition measures. On average, the
Boone’s index equals 2.8: a 1 percent increase in costs leads to a nearly 3 percent decrease in
profits. This measure is characterised by high variability: for example, in one market a one
percent increase in costs leads to a 25% decrease in profits, whereas in another market the
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profit elasticity is as low as 1.15%.5
Figure 2 summarises the PEs and the PCMs found in the data with histograms. (One
should note that the PCM and the Boone index are measured on different scales: the PCM
varies between 0 and 1, whereas the Boone indicator is greater than 0 but can assume, at least
in principle, any positive value.) If the two measures captured markets’ competitive pressure
correctly, one would expect a negative high correlation between them; in other words, the
Boone indicator should signal low efficiencies whenever the PCM picks up high mark-ups.
One can see that the correlation of the Boone index to the PCM is significant and has the
right sign (negative).6
Figure 2: Competition measures densities: Boone index (left panel) and PCM (right panel).
Interesting features of this section’s analysis of competition are as follows: 1) industries
characterised by a large number of operating firms are not necessarily those with the highest
PEs; 2) different measures of competition have relatively low correlation and are distributed
very differently over industries. These facts prompt us to give a closer look to the link between
number of firms and competition measures.
4.2 Market structure and competitiveness
An important issue, both from an academic and policy-making point of view, is the link
between markets’ concentration and competitiveness. Are more concentrated markets, ie
markets with a low number of firms, necessarily less competitive than markets characterised
by a large number of operating firms? The analysis of the previous section showed that the
Boone indicator (in absolute value) does not increase with the number of firms in an industry.
5Boone et al. (2007) computes an average PE value of 7% for the Dutch economy, for the period 1993-2002,
with variability similar to the one found in Luxembourgish data. Griffith et al. (2005) find much higher values
across UK markets. Braila et al. (2010) measure generally low PEs for Belgian industries, and provide a
competitiveness ranking of European countries based on the PE index which points at the UK as the most
competitive economy. Care is needed, however, when comparing results for various countries, as the industries
and/or the periods covered by the databases analysed may differ.
6The Boone index is computed at industry level, whereas the PCM is computed at firm level. So, to
compute a meaningful correlation, we measure PCM at industry level by a weighted average of firms margins.
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A related issue is whether industries characterised by a large number of small enterprises are
more competitive than sectors characterised by larger firms.
To explore the relation between markets’ concentration and competitiveness, we compute
once again the Boone index for two sub-samples of firms, formed according to whether firms
employ less or more than 50 workers. (This threshold value is also used by Boone et al., 2007,
for a similar analysis.)7 Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix report results for the Boone regressions
run on these two datasets. The comparison of those results shows that, on average, the Boone
index is lower for small firms, although its variance is also lower. (The PCM is higher.) This
can also be seen in figure 3, which uses histograms to summarise the distributions of the
PEs for the two groups. The center of the large firms’ PE distribution is clearly shifted to
the right, toward larger values of the Boone index, compared to the small firms distribution.
When looking at single industries performances, in many cases the Boone indicator is higher
for the large firms group. One should note, however, that comparing the two groups of firms
by looking at single industries’ performances presents some difficulties, as the number of
observations on large firms is at times insufficient to allow regression analysis. This is because
the two, small and large, types of firms are observed at different frequencies over industries.
(For example, one of the heavy traditional industries, such as basic metals manufacturing, is
absent from the small firms group.)
The comparison of competition measures for small and large firms to those computed for
the whole population shows that the average Boone index increases considerably from 2.84 to
5.00 for the large firms, and decreases slightly for the smaller firms, down to 2.69. The ranking
of industries according to the PE does not change when the whole population is restricted to
the small firms group.
So, the results above suggest that there is not clear link between the intensity of com-
petition and number of operating firms. Furthermore, large firms seem to face more intense
competition than smaller firms. This contrasts with the widely-held view that SMEs increase
market’s competitiveness and innovation. Boone et al. (2007) have compared the competition
pressure faced by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to the one faced by large enterprises
(BEs) in the Netherlands, and found similar results. These authors suggest that the fact that
large firms are characterised by higher profit elasticity may be due to the type of market
faced by this type of firms, as BEs compete in national markets whereas SMEs compete in
local markets. This issue is relevant to the Luxembourg case, as the reference market varies
widely over firms/industries. Unfortunately the SBS does not include this sort of information,
but the CIS survey gives some interesting insight: Asikainen (2008, page 3) notes that “the
domestic market is not the primary market for local firms. [...] The majority of the firms
declare to compete in the international markets (51% in the Grande Region,8 39% within the
rest of the EU countries).”
7Officially, in the EU, enterprises qualify as micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) if they
fulfill the criteria laid down in the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC. These sets a threshold for the
number of employees, which must be lower than 250, and the turnover, which should be lower than 50 million
euros.
8The Grande Region comprises also Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland in Germany, Lorraine in France and
Belgian Luxembourg.
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Table 3: Estimated Boone Index of competition
Industry name Boone t-value p-value adj R2 F stat N
Other mining and quarrying -4.22 -2.96 0.00 0.79 19.91 11
Food products -5.47 -14.02 0.00 0.80 243 120
Textiles -5.58 -7.60 0.00 0.97 210 14
Wood & wood products -7.49 -2.39 0.06 0.92 43.82 8
Paper & printing -4.12 -8.51 0.00 0.84 156 61
Chemicals -2.50 -2.54 0.03 0.57 8.93 13
Rubber & plastic products -2.33 -5.39 0.00 0.80 44.01 23
Other non-metal. mineral products -3.14 -6.29 0.00 0.91 133 26
Basic metals -5.66 -0.90 0.37 0.39 1.76 11
Fabricated metal products -5.04 -12.08 0.00 0.71 158 132
Machinery & equipment n.e.c. -5.56 -4.89 0.00 0.75 47.05 31
Machinery & electrical equipment -14.68 -8.11 0.00 0.95 78.35 10
Medical, precision and -6.61 -5.23 0.00 0.74 37.40 27
optical instruments
Transport equipment -25.20 -4.95 0.01 0.78 13.37 8
Furniture -5.74 -6.33 0.00 0.61 25.69 32
Recycling -4.49 -2.59 0.03 0.53 6.16 10
Electricity, gas & water supply -1.21 -4.76 0.00 0.73 25.03 18
Construction -4.42 -54.62 0.00 0.82 3085 1380
Wholesale & retail trade -1.71 -68.80 0.00 0.85 4459 1609
Business Services -2.46 -48.62 0.00 0.67 1731 1675
Results for regressions performed with less than 6 observations are not reported due to data confiden-
tiality.
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Figure 3: Boone index distribution: (left panel) firms with less than 50 employees; (right
panel) firms with more than 50 employees.
4.3 Competition and innovation
This section presents an empirical analysis of the relation between competition and innovation
in Luxembourg. The empirical model used to test this relation, largely inspired by the
frameworks proposed by Aghion et al. (2005) and Griffith et al. (2006), consists of estimating
the following innovation equation:
ln(RDi) = β0 + β1COMPj + β2DTFj + β3COMPj ×DTFj + β4 ln(Li) + βk
∑
k
Di + εi; (3)
Here, RD denotes R&D expenses and COMP the measure of competition. Markets’ compet-
itive pressure is measured by the Boone index, computed in the previous section. (This choice
was discussed in Section 2.) Employment (L) controls for the firms’ size. DTF measures the
average size of the technology gap within an industry: high levels of DTF imply that the
industry is closer to the technology frontier. Thus, this variable provides a measure of het-
erogeneity in technical efficiency across industries.9 The interaction term (COMP ×DTF )
allows the marginal effect of competition on innovation to depend on the firms’ distance to
the frontier, introducing a non-linear term in the model. The Ds are a set of dummy vari-
ables which group firms according to the Technological Intensity (TI) taxonomy (see Section
3.1). This classification divides manufacturing industries into medium, low and high-tech
industries. Here, due to limited number of observations, and the structure of Luxembourg’s
9The technology gap variable is derived as follows. First, we compute each firm’s total factor productivity
(TFP), where TFP is given by the ratio of output to production inputs. (Production inputs are usually labour
and capital.) The frontier is given by the firm with the highest total factor productivity (TFP) within an
industry. Then, we average each firm’s distance to the frontier in one industry, using the formula:
DTFij =
∑n
i
TFPi−TFPFj
TFPi
nj
, (4)
where the subscript F denotes the frontier firm in industry j, and n the number of firms in industry j.
Clearly, values of DTF are comprised between 0 and 1, and a low value of DTF implies that a firm is
closer to the frontier. The average distance measure included in the regression is then transformed as follows:
DTFj = 1−DTFij . So, higher values of DTF imply that firms are closer to the frontier.
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economy, we consider three groups of industries: low-tech (base category), medium and high-
tech, and services.10 The subscript i refers to firms and the subscript j refers to industries.
Robustness of results is established by checking if different measures of competition, such
as PCM, and different data-level (industry and firm-level) lead to the same conclusions.
Due to the lack of data, it was not possible to include the capital intensity ratio (K/L)
and the measures of skills of the workforce, included in similar studies. So, the DTF measure
should be interpreted as a measure of efficiency in the use of the labour input (that is,
effectiveness of labour).
Table 4 presents results of a simple test for the linearity of the relation competition-
innovation. This is done by fitting the following regression equation:
ln(RDi) = α0 + α1COMPj + α2COMP
2
j + α3COMP
3
j + α4ln(Li) + i; (5)
The results suggest that the relation between competition and innovation is non-linear in this
data.
To explain this non-linearity, we estimate a basic version of the innovation model of
equation 3 where competition is measured, respectively, by the Boone index and the PCM,
at industry and firm-level. (The latter measure allow us to test the sensitivity of results to
the data levels.)11 The TI dummies are not included at this stage. The last three columns of
table 4 give the estimation results.
When measured by the Boone index (column 2), competition has a negative effect on
innovation. The positive sign of the interaction term, however, shows that this effect has
a switch that depends on the values of the technology gap measure. In other words, the
marginal effect of competition on R&D expenses depends on the level of DTF, as follows:
∂ln(RD)
∂COMP
= β1 + β3DTF (6)
For example, if DTF equals 0.5, the derivative of R&D with respect to COMP is positive and
equal to about 0.2. The turning point is 0.35: larger DTF values imply a positive relation
between competition and innovation. Thus, the positive sign of the interaction term indicates
that this variable partly offset the effect of competition measures on R&D. (Similarly, the
positive effect of DTF on R&D is reinforced by the intensity of competition.) This suggests
that competition is good for innovation efforts when firms are close to the technological
frontier. By contrast, when firms are far from the frontier, increasing competition hampers
incentives to innovate. This latter case seems the most relevant to Luxembourg, as firms
are characterised by low technological efficiency (one can see figure 4 in the appendix, which
reports the distribution of the distances to the frontier).12
Thus, the negative sign for the Boone index implies that competition has a negative effect
on innovation, but this is reversed as the technology gap becomes smaller and industries
are more efficient. This is confirmed by the firm-level regressions (column 4). (Neither
competition nor the interaction term are significant when competition is measured by the
PCM at industry level.) The efficiency gap as a direct positive effect on innovation, implying
10One should note that the service category includes also gas, electricity and water supply and the construc-
tion industry.
11Industry level PCM indices are computed as weighted averages of individual PCMs, where weights are
firms’ market shares.
12These results are confirmed when using firms’ level distances to technology. Results not reported here for
reasons of space.
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that firms spend more in R&D when they are closer to the frontier, but this effect is significant
only in the firm-level regression. Furthermore, firm size appears as an important determinant
of innovation expenditure.
An issue with this analysis is the fact that the distinction between the firm engaging
or not engaging in R&D cannot be assumed as purely random. (In other words, the data
analysed in the above regression should be regarded as a non-random sample of firms having
non-zero R&D expenses.) This gives rise to a potential sample-selection bias. To tackle this
problem, the innovation equations are re-estimated using a Heckman selection model. The
Heckman model addresses the selection bias by modelling explicitly the decision to engage
in R&D by jointly estimating a selection equation and an outcome equation. The selection
equation determines whether a firm chooses to innovate or not innovate, whereas the outcome
equations establishes determinants of the level of R&D expenses. Here, it is assumed that
the selection mechanism is determined by firms’ efficiency (that is, total factor productivity
computed at firm level), firms’ size and by the level of competition in the industry. (All
variables are significant in determining the decision to innovate. Results are not reported but
are available from the author.)
Results from the estimation of the full specification of the innovation equation are reported
in table 5 and 6.
First of all, one can see that the correlation coefficients (ρ) is significantly different from
zero, which supports the choice of the selection model.
The size of the firm is a significant determinant of R&D expenses across all specifications.
The coefficient of the Boone index has a negative sign, with one exception (column 3), whereas
the interaction term is positive, confirming the result of non-linearity in the relation between
competition and innovation. The industry dummies are significant and positive for the high-
tech industries. In contrast, the sign of the coefficient is negative for the dummy which
identifies service industries. Service industries spend relatively less in R&D than manufac-
turing; manufacturing industries which are classified as medium or high-tech spend relatively
more than those classified as low-tech industries.
The regression in the third column includes the square of the Boone indicator, to check
for residuals non-linearities and/or omitted variables. This extra variable is significant, which
leads us to re-estimate the model using a slighlty different specification (fourth column). This
includes a measure of technological heterogeneity within industries (DTFS). Technological
efficiency is regarded as relevant in determining innovation decisions in both theoretical and
empirical studies. In particular, Aghion et al. (2005) and Boone (2000) shows that the tech-
nology distribution and firms’ relative position in the markets affect the relation between
competition and innovation. (In Aghion et al., 2005, industries can be “levelled” or “unlev-
elled”, and in the latter case competition has a negative effect on innovation). The measure
DTF , however, averages firms’ distances to the industry technological frontier, so it is not
capable to fully capture the technology spread within industries. This is why we introduce
DTFS, defined as the variance of of individual DTF s within industries. This variable turns
out highly significant, with a negative impact on R&D expenditure. In other words, sec-
tors that are more heterogenous and are characterised by large gaps among firms are also
characterised by lower R&D expenditure.
The impact of DTF is more difficult to assess, as the sign of its associated coefficient is
not stable across specifications. Interestingly, in the specification with DTFS, this variable
is no longer significant and retains significancy only when interacting with the competition
measure.
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Table 4: Competition and innovation I: Boone index
Dependent variable: log R&D expenses
Boone PCM PCM (firm-level)
COMP -0.34∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.12 3.25∗∗∗
(-2.19) (-3.07) (-0.05) (4.50)
COMP2 0.11∗∗
(2.08)
COMP3 -0.003∗
(-1.85)
DTF 8.94 13.44 18.95∗∗∗
(1.70) (1.37) (4.72)
DTF*COMP 1.27∗∗∗ 3.54 -19.10∗∗∗
(2.91) (0.11) (-3.50)
log employment 0.95∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(6.82) (7.52) ) (8.30) (6.40)
adj R2 0.34 0.43 0.46 0.50
F stat 122∗∗∗ 72.40∗∗∗ 86.40∗∗∗ 36.21∗∗∗
N 1933 1243
∗ ∗ ∗: 1% significance level∗∗: 5% significance level. Robust t-ratios are in parenthesis (clustered se).
RD is R&D expenses; COMP is the competition measure; DTF is average distance to tech-
nology frontier; L is employment.
To check robustness of results, we re-estimate the innovation regressions using an alterna-
tive measure of competition, the PCM, which is available at firm level. As noted above, this
allows us to test the sensitivity of results to the data levels. Table 6 gives the results from the
estimation of the the innovation equation with the PCM index computed at firm level (first
two columns) and aggregated at industry level (last two columns).
The PCM at firm level shows a positive and significant relation with R&D expenses,
suggesting once again that competition is inversely related to innovation. (Recall that higher
PCM levels are associated to lower competition.) Once again, firms’ size and TI dummies is
positive and significant. The effect of DTF is positive and significant across specifications.
The negative sign of the interaction term once again indicates that DTF offset the negative
effect of competition on R&D.
In summary, in our data the relation competition-innovation has a U shape, as the neg-
ative effect of competition on innovation is partially offset by the interaction of competition
and technological efficiency. This contrasts to previous studies, which found an inverted U-
relationship between competition and innovation. Results, however, typically vary greatly
across countries. (One can see Polder and Veldhuizen, 2010, who offer some empirical and
theoretical explanations for the failure of detecting an inverted U.) .
A possible interpretation for this result is as follows. Luxembourg industries are typically
heterogeneous, that is, they are characterised by the presence of large firms alongside smaller
firms. If we interpret these as “unlevelled” industries, we are in the situation described by
Aghion et al. (2005), where competition lowers firms’ incentives to innovate. These authors
argues that in “unlevelled” industries, characterised by higher spread in technology and higher
distance to the frontier, increases in competition lower innovation. Indeed, in our data we
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found evidence that industries heterogeneity negatively affects the innovation effort; we also
noted that that Luxembourg industries are typically far from the frontier.
Other noticeable results from this analysis are as follows. Firstly, the size of firms, as
measured by employment, is confirmed as an important determinant of both the decision
to innovate and the innovation intensity. (This result is also found in the CIS-based study
by Mangiarotti, 2010; in contrast, Asikainen, 2008, finds a negative relation between R&D
intensity and firms’ size, which may be due to the innovation variable definition.) Second, the
service sector does not innovate more than other industries and its innovation performance is
comparable to low-tech industries. (This confirms results in Asikainen, 2008, where R&D is
higher in financial services - not included in this analysis - but lower for business services.)
One should note that the regression results presented in this section should be interpreted
with care as this analysis suffers from several limitations, such as lack of a time series dimen-
sion and difficulties in industry classification. These limitations will be addressed in future
research, and are briefly discussed in the concluding remarks.
Table 5: Competition and innovation II: Boone index
Dependent variable: log R&D expenses
Boone -0.07 -0.40∗∗∗ 1.12∗∗∗ -1.09∗∗∗
(-1.25) (-5.35) (3.89) (-8.70)
Boone2 -0.29∗∗∗
(-5.28)
DTF 8.20∗∗∗ -12.46∗∗∗ -20.13∗∗∗ 0.08
(4.30) (-4.60) (-5.10) (-0.03)
DTF*Boone 0.65∗∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 5.10∗∗∗ 2.86∗∗∗
(2.45) (5.92) (7.60) (8.53)
DTFS -17.85∗∗∗
(-6.75)
employment 0.85∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(19.80) (18.85) (18.46) (17.85)
services -0.85∗∗ -1.10∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗
(-2.33) (-2.99) (-3.30)
high-tech 4.18∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 3.07∗∗∗
(9.70) (7.43) (6.72)
LR test (ρ = 0) 36.07∗∗∗ 37.68∗∗∗ 44.50∗∗∗ 45.55∗∗∗
χ2 stat 128∗∗∗ 155∗∗∗ 193∗∗∗ 338∗∗∗
N 7242
5 Conclusions
This article has analysed the relation between market competition and innovation in Luxem-
bourg’s industries using business survey data. Firstly, the competitive pressure in Luxem-
bourgish markets was assessed using the Boone index, a state-of-the-art indicator based on
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Table 6: Competition and innovation II: PCM
Dependent variable: log R&D expenses
PCM 2.36∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 3.42∗∗
(4.70) (4.96) (4.65) (3.98)
PCM2 (-0.03)∗∗
(-2.55)
DTF 21.90∗∗∗ 7.53∗∗∗ 6.65∗∗ 9.55∗∗∗
(10.91) (2.45) (2.64) (3.25)
DTF*PCM -35.90∗∗∗ -25.30∗∗∗ -25.45∗∗ -23.15∗∗∗
(-4.95) (-3.70) (-3.55) (-3.25)
DTFS 1.15
(0.48)
log employment 0.80∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(13.45) (11.67) (9.20) (11.27)
services -0.20 -0.55 -0.04
(-0.57) (-1.62) (-0.12)
high-tech 3.90∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗∗
(8.10) (7.90) (7.78)
LR test (ρ = 0) 11.50∗∗∗ 11.40∗∗∗ 11.60∗∗∗ 11.85∗∗
χ2 stat 90∗∗∗ 73∗∗∗ 155∗∗∗ 211∗∗∗
N 5220
measuring the cost efficiency of firms. Then, the relation between competition and innovation
was analysed using regression analysis.
Main results are as follows:
• Luxembourgish firms are generally characterised by low level of competition intensity.
Low profit-cost elasticities are found for the wholesale sector and for public utilities,
markets that are relevant for competition policy and regulation.
• More concentrated markets, that is, markets where the number of firms is low, are
not necessarily associated with lower competitive intensity. Furthermore, industries
characterised by an important presence of small firms are not more competitive than
industries characterised by large firms. We suggest a possible explanation based on the
different reference markets for firms;
• Competition has a significant effect on R&D expenses. The relation competition-
innovation, however, is non-linear in this data, in the sense that it depends crucially on
the technical efficiency of firms within an industry. In particular, we find a positive re-
lation between competition and innovation efforts, as measured by R&D expenditures,
when firms are close to the technological frontier. When firms are far away from the
frontier, increases in competition can result in lower incentives to innovate. This is
supported by the theory and is practically relevant in the light of the poor performance
of Luxembourgish manufacturing industries in terms of efficient use of inputs.
• Innovation is a negative function of technological heterogeneity within industries.
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The analysis of this article has several limitations, which suggest directions for further
research. This analysis has highlighted the complex relation existing between market structure
(firms number and size), competitiveness, and innovation. One of its limitation is that the
NACE classification is a poor representation of what a market is. The market size and the
market of reference could vary greatly from firm to firm, even within the same industry. This
issue is particularly relevant for small open economies and in particular for Luxembourg.
Furthermore, the lack of a time series dimension in this analysis makes difficult to deal
with problems of endogeneity and reverse causality in the relation between competition and
innovation. It also makes more difficult the evaluation of results, in terms of robustness of
competition rankings over time. Furthermore, the analysis of the evolution of competition
and its relation with innovation over time is of interest per se.
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Appendix: Competition measures
Table 7: Boone Index: firms with less than 50 employees
Boone
Industry name param. t-value p-value adj R2 F stat N
Autres industries extractives -4.07 -2.80 0.03 0.65 8.40 9
Industrie alimentaires -5.29 -12.87 0.00 0.71 124.71 101
Industrie textile -5.22 -4.24 0.00 0.88 33.38 10
Travail du bois -9.11 -2.60 0.06 0.85 17.70 7
Industrie du papier et du carton -3.80 -7.69 0.00 0.67 53.33 52
Industrie chimique -3.97 -1.00 0.37 0.23 0.63 7
Industrie des plastiques -1.96 -2.89 0.02 0.43 4.37 10
Fabrication d’autres produits min. -3.14 -4.61 0.00 0.78 22.45 13
Travail des metaux -4.81 -11.97 0.00 0.63 98.76 116
Fabric. machines et equipments -4.98 -3.48 0.00 0.61 15.66 20
Fabric. instruments medicaux -6.20 -5.67 0.00 0.61 18.82 24
precision, optique
Fabrication des meubles -5.74 -6.33 0.00 0.61 25.69 32
Recuperation -4.29 -2.03 0.10 0.41 3.41 8
Production et dis. electricite -1.12 -4.61 0.00 0.66 61.60 14
Captage et dist. d’eau
Construction -4.36 -52.08 0.00 0.78 2190.29 1256
Commerce de gros -1.71 -67.84 0.00 0.83 3885.01 1564
Service aux entreprises -2.41 -49.17 0.00 0.67 1644.63 1585
Variable/Summary stat: Mean Median St. dev. Min Max Obs
Boone index 2.69 2.41 1.19 1.07 14.96 13321
PCM 0.56 0.27 .00 .99 9677
Corr. Boone-PCM -0.75
We report results for industries with at least 6 firms.
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Table 8: Boone Index: firms with more than 50 employees
Boone
Industry name param. t-value p-value adj R2 F stat N
Industrie alimentaires -6.60 -5.00 0.000 0.68 19.76 19
Industrie du papier et du carton -4.99 -2.07 0.084 0.47 4.58 9
Industrie des plastiques -3.71 -4.39 0.001 0.87 41.66 13
Fabric. d’autres produits min. -3.03 -4.10 0.002 0.73 17.04 13
Metallurgie -5.66 -0.77 0.471 0.13 0.48 9
Travail des metaux -4.15 -1.24 0.238 0.58 11.43 16
Fabric. machines et equip. -10.70 -4.79 0.001 0.87 33.22 11
Construction -4.47 -15.53 0.000 0.77 204.00 124
Commerce de gros -1.58 -11.12 0.000 0.76 70.09 45
Service aux entreprises -5.62 -11.11 0.000 0.58 61.91 90
Variable/Summary stat: Mean Median St. dev. Min Max Obs
Boone index 5.00 4.47 3.00 1.58 25.89 404
PCM .24 .25 .00 .98 379
Corr. Boone-PCM -0.51
We report results for industries with at least 6 firms.
Figure 4: Distances to the technology frontier: distribution.
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